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Abstract 
With China’s Belt and Road Initiative in full swing, this paper identifies a new “Great Game” in the 
Eurasian heartland. However, rather than the geopolitical chess of the nineteenth century, the new 
game is wei qi. In a process of gradual encirclement and subtle coercion, China is outplaying the EU 
on the Eurasian continent while avoiding direct confrontation. Following the logic of wei qi, China has 
shown a tendency to occupy the spaces that the EU has neglected – namely the Balkans and the East 
Mediterranean. Yet the game has not been won yet. Recent crises have undermined China’s global 
image, and hitherto overeager Eastern European countries are now acting with more caution towards 
Chinese investors. The EU can be an equal player, but it must do more to “bring along” the struggling 
economies in its periphery, while counterbalancing China’s influence with alternative partnerships in 
the Middle East and Asia. 
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Introduction 
The “Great Game” trope is a problematic one. First used in reference to the almost 
century-long competition between the British and Russian empires over Central Asia, 
the term has since been shoehorned by opportunistic commentators in an attempt to 
describe nearly every Great Power conflict since. The term endures because of the 
imagery it evokes: stern men in uniform playing geopolitical chess over a map of the 
globe. Yet geopolitics is not a chess game. There are no frontlines, there are no 
coloured-in power blocs on the map. Modern international relationships are diffuse 
and intertwined. 
Yet while the traditional conception of the “Great Game” may no longer apply, some of 
its underlying premises endure. Notably, with China’s Belt and Road Initiative well 
underway, the importance of Central Asia seems clearer than ever before. Indeed, Chen 
and Fazilov (2018) refer to a new “Great Game” in the Eurasian Heartland – a nod to 
Mackinder (1904). With this westward-facing shift in Chinese geostrategy, the 
European Union is now having to share its backyard with the new superpower. Indeed, 
the EU now finds itself in a competition for influence, not only in its near-Asian 
periphery, but also – seemingly – in many disillusioned Eastern and Southern 
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European nations. China has a tendency to go wherever the EU is not: former Soviet 
nations distrustful of the West or struggling Mediterranean economies that blame 
Brussels for years of neglect. In these already drifting regions, the EU risks falling into 
irrelevance. 
This begs the question: is China outperforming the EU in a new “great game” of soft 
power influence? This notion is particularly troubling because, according to Biscop 
(2020), the EU still lacks a coherent, unified approach to China – remaining distracted 
by internal divisions and strife. If the EU is to remain a coherent actor in the face of 
China’s Belt and Road Initiative – a partner rather than a pawn – and if it wants to be, 
as Commission President Ursula Von der Leyen (2019) says, “more geopolitical”, it 
needs to develop a coherent strategy for the defining geopolitical relationship of our 
time. This paper, then, seeks to argue that, while China might have a head start on the 
EU, Europe still has the opportunity to be a meaningful global player. 
To this end, this paper shall first delineate the nature of the new “Great Game”, and 
how it is played. It shall then consider how this has unfolded in the European context, 
whether Chinese influence is potentially outperforming that of the EU, as well as the 
specific dynamics that are hampering the EU’s response. To contrast this, the paper 
will identify areas where Chinese influence has failed to make headway, and where it 
has made missteps. This will allow the paper to give an indication of the opportunities 
that remain open for the EU, and thus potentially provide entry points for a coherent 
EU policy response to China. In doing so, this paper shall demonstrate that while the 
EU may be a step behind China in the new great game, it has ample opportunity to 
catch up. 
Defining the New Great Game 
Brzezinski’s (1997) notion of a “Grand Chessboard” with Central Asia as the key pivot 
is fraught with problems. For one, it typifies the sort of two-dimensional, 
confrontational thinking that renders realist perceptions of international relations into 
a self-fulfilling prophecy (McNeilly, 2014). Yet the underlying premise of Brzezinski’s 
thought – the importance of Central Asia – appears to hold true. An early indication of 
this was the forming of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in 2001. Djalal 
(2006, p. 43) described the SCO as an example of the “geopolitics of cooperation”, 
where critical regions are stabilised through multilateral partnership, rather than 
through unilateral force. According to Manuel (2017, p. 127–128), this is similarly the 
goal of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Central Asia and the Middle East. To Chen 
and Fazilov (2018, p. 3) this strategy is very much the new “Great Game”. Unlike the 
old game, however, China has sought to bring places of the world that have been 
historically disillusioned with the West into its sphere of influence through mutual 
partnerships and infrastructure investment (Sachs, 2018, p. 60–61). Rather than being 
a competition in the traditional sense, then, China has shown a tendency to “softly go” 
wherever the EU – and the West at-large – is not. 
The new “Great Game”, then, is not chess. In fact, it resembles more the Chinese game 
of wei qi. Henry Kissinger (2011, p. 23) himself argues that where Western strategies 
resembles those of chess, Chinese strategy resembles that of wei qi. In wei qi, the goal 
is to outmanoeuvre one’s opponent without direct confrontation, and to flow into – 
and occupy – the spaces between the opponent’s pieces. According to Pan (2016), the 





connections, as opposed to entrenched Black-White power blocs. This process of 
gradual encirclement, identifying subtle connections, and avoiding confrontation, 
starkly resembles the course of the BRI. 
Europe on the back foot? 
In Central Asia, and now in Europe, China is playing wei qi, and Europe has yet to 
properly respond. The clearest demonstration of this is the way China has effectively 
“flowed into” the spaces that the EU has left empty. Rrustemi et al. (2019, p. 89–91) 
note how Chinese investment has been focused on areas that have historically been at 
odds with Western Europe: Albania, Serbia, and Montenegro. These countries have 
been described as having both a “favourable economic climate” for investment as well 
as particularly “high readiness” of political elites for cooperation with China (Brattberg 
& Etienne, 2018, p. 1; Rrustemi et al., 2019, p. 93). In these areas, Chinese investment 
– initiated through the “17+1” forum of 17 European economies – has taken the typical 
form of loans and infrastructure development common of the BRI. Noteworthy 
projects include the Belgrade-Budapest Railway, the revitalisation of the Zelezara 
Smederevo Steel Mill, the acquisition of the Tirana airport in Albania, and the 
controversial development of the region’s telecommunications by Huawei and ZTE 
(Rrustemi et al., 2019, p. 93–97). Further, Chinese investment has taken advantage of 
countries affected by the eurozone crisis, most famously with the acquisition of the 
Piraeus port in Greece (Brattberg & Etienne, 2018, p. 1).  
These economic investments have bought China clear diplomatic gains. Brattberg and 
Etienne (2018, p. 2) note that both Greece and Hungary – two BRI countries – have 
broken with the EU in recent times, blocking critique of Chinese activity in the South 
China Sea, as well as a statement condemning crackdowns on Chinese activists 
(Rrustemi et al., 2019, p. 102). The popularity of Chinese investment in the Balkans 
has also led to Italy entering bilateral talks for infrastructure and cultural cooperation 
with China (Brattberg & Etienne, 2018, p. 2). At the same time, China has also 
encouraged non-EU positions in the Balkans – notably in its rejection to recognise both 
Kosovo and North Macedonia (Rrustemi et al., 2019, p. 99).  
Nonetheless, while China’s efforts in the Balkans are undoubtedly Sino-centric, they 
are not necessarily malicious (Manuel, 2017, 126; Sachs, 2018, p. 60–61). Rrustemi et 
al. (2019, p. 105) note that “there is no strong indication that China will seek to use its 
economic influence to cause political instability in the region, as this could negatively 
impact Chinese BRI.” Rather, the risk is that these countries – either EU members or 
candidates for membership – could pose long-term “backdoor” impediments to 
European interests and stymie the global reach of Europe’s strategic capabilities 
(Geeraerts, 2019, p. 2). Particularly, there is concern Chinese lending will lead to ‘debt 
trap diplomacy” in the Balkans, leaving these countries even more susceptible to 
Chinese normative influence (Geeraerts, 2019, p. 3). Indeed, according to Rrustemi et 
al. (2019, p. 90) there is a concerning attitude among Balkan governments that “we 
will worry about it later” regarding their mounting debt dependence on China. 
According to Gehrke (2019, p. 4), there is also a concern that the “17+1” mechanism 
will be used as a “bargaining chip” by China in Brussels, “offering less intensive [17+1] 
engagement in return for political support on other portfolios”. 
These issues have been the focus of EU policy response thus far. A European 
Commission (2018) report stressed the need for rapid infrastructure investment in 
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Europe’s East and South, to provide an alternative to the BRI. Similarly, another report 
(European Commission, 2019), acknowledged that Beijing was becoming a systemic 
rival in some areas, while also a strategic partner in others. Yet despite this, a coherent, 
collaborative foreign policy direction has yet to emerge between the Union’s Member 
States. According to Biscop (2020, p. 6), there remain deep divisions between Member 
States on foreign policy issues, particularly regarding China. Moreover, this has been 
further compounded by ongoing domestic instability in Europe – from Brexit, to the 
gilets jaunes, to the weakening of the Merkel Coalition in the 2017 German election 
(Smith & Taussig, 2020). Europe is thus divided at multiple levels, complicating the 
emergence of a proactive and unified foreign policy. 
Another key problem is that, thus far, EU offerings to Balkan countries have been so 
meagre that they have made any offer from Beijing look attractive (Financial Times, 
2019; Biscop, 2020, p. 5). French President Emmanuel Macron himself, in a recent 
interview with the Financial Times (Mallet & Khalaf, 2020), accused Northern 
European countries of failing to fulfil their responsibilities to their Southern, less 
developed, counterparts. Macron (Mallet & Khalaf, 2020) suggested that the EU has 
done nothing but dictate requirements to struggling Eastern and Southern European 
governments, shouldering them with the continent’s burdens, while offering them little 
assistance in return. Further, Kavalski and Mayer (2019) note the hypocrisy of Western 
European nations that criticise the 17+1 mechanism, despite the biggest beneficiaries 
of Chinese investment being Germany, France and the UK. This hypocrisy is not lost 
on the nations of Europe’s South and East, adding to their disillusionment with 
Brussels. Such attitudes have thus increased these nations’ vulnerability to Chinese 
interests, providing ample opportunity for China to “fill the void”. If this were a wei qi 
game, Europe seems to have already ceded much of the board. 
European wariness and China’s missteps 
Nonetheless, China’s influence is not as pronounced as it might at first seem. Many 
beneficiary nations of Chinese investment are still resisting Beijing’s attempts at 
political influence. Poland and Czechia – two 17+1 countries – both recently 
announced that they were banning Huawei from involvement in developing their 
respective 5G networks (Kavalski & Mayer, 2019). Last year, Prague broke its sister-
city ties with Beijing over heavy-handed attempts by the latter to incorporate a “One 
China” recognition statement in their agreement (Lau, 2019). Such examples suggest 
that European nations are not ignorant of the quid-pro-quo political influence that 
Beijing is trying to wield over them. In response, BRI investment in Europe has been 
quietly toned down, and Chinese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Europe has fallen 
by almost 70%, with only one new 17+1 project – a tire factory in Serbia – resulting 
from the most recent BRI forum (Gehrke, 2019, p. 1; Kavalski & Mayer, 2019).  
In addition, early indications suggest that the current COVID-19 crisis isn’t playing out 
well for China’s soft power image. Despite some early success, China’s attempts at – 
what has now been dubbed – “mask diplomacy” have backfired. Beijing’s initial 
shipments of medical supplies to Europe have been widely criticised as a mere 
propaganda stunt, and much of the equipment has since been found to be faulty or of 
poor quality (Crawford & Martin, 2020; Lane, 2020; Van Leeuwen, 2020). At the same 
time, allegations have emerged of Chinese price-gouging of other medical supplies – 
leading German Green Party member, Reinhard Bütikofer, to emphatically remark 





its own self-image as a stabilising force in the current crisis has thus somewhat 
backfired. According to Crawford and Martin (2020) the crisis, if anything, has spurred 
discussions about decreasing Europe’s trade dependence on China. Beijing’s influence 
in Europe is thus far less pronounced than might immediately seem evident. European 
nations are not so susceptible to foreign interference, and rising Chinese investment is 
beginning to be met with unease (Gehrke, 2019, p. 1). While China might have the 
upper-hand, Europe has not lost control of the wei qi board yet. 
Playing the game 
The European Union can still regain its footing in the new Great Game. To do so it 
needs to realise its role as an equal player with distinct interests, lest it become caught 
in the middle of a new Great Power struggle. To Gehrke (2019, p. 7), this will be the 
EU’s greatest challenge in the coming decade. At the same time, it needs to seek 
common ground with China, and not merely become “hostage to partisan conspiracy 
theories” and fear mongering of a new “Red Peril” (Kavalski & Mayer, 2019). Similarly, 
the EU should not regard the relationship as a simple “power game”, but instead 
recognise the complex interdependencies that it has with China, and work towards 
shaping and balancing these (Geeraerts, 2019, p. 4–5). In playing wei qi, then, the EU 
should not seek to “win” – like the empires sought in the Great Game of old – but 
simply to “keep up”; to be an equal, and autonomous partner. 
To achieve this, the EU needs to both contest the spaces China is seeking to occupy, 
and – at the same time – flow to the spaces where Chinese influence remains absent. 
Regarding the former, the EU should increase its commitment – and investments – to 
improving infrastructure networks in its under-developed South-East and in the 
Western Balkans (Biscop, 2020, p. 5). To Gehrke (2019, p. 5), a necessary component 
of this involves leveraging the resources of the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development – which could begin to credibly shape market standards in the region. In 
addition, the EU needs to develop robust investment screening, “raising awareness” of 
the potential risks of Chinese investment, and – while not directly interfering in their 
decisions – offering advice and guidelines to beneficiary nations (Biscop, 2020, p. 2; 
Gehrke, 2019, p. 2; Smith & Taussig, 2020). Further, the EU should seek to “level the 
playing field” by strengthening competition laws, as well as consider the establishment 
of state-backed EU firms to compete with Chinese state enterprises (Biscop, 2020, p. 
5; Gehrke, 2019, p. 3; Smith & Taussig, 2020). Finally, the EU needs to work towards 
building a more compelling narrative of its achievements. As much as 70% of FDI in 
Serbia does in fact come from the EU, yet despite this the country continues to warm 
to China, and popular perceptions of the Union have continued to decline (Gehrke, 
2019, p. 6). The EU thus needs to sell its image better – especially given that China has 
become remarkably good at using a range of platforms and diplomatic channels to 
broadcast its own achievements (Gehrke, 2019, p. 6). These measures will enable the 
EU not only to compete at the same level as China in Europe’s South-East, but also to 
potentially influence Chinese firms by better shaping market standards and practices 
in the region. 
The second essential aspect of the EU’s strategy is to start asserting its interests in the 
spaces where China has remained absent. Geranmayeh (2018, p. 8) notes that both 
China and the EU have been largely sidelined by Russia and the US in the Gulf and 
Middle East. Yet this creates an opportunity – especially given the steady withdrawal 
of the US – for the EU to begin exercising its own distinct interests in the region 
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(Geranmayeh, 2018, p. 9). Particularly, the EU should sustain its commitment to the 
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action – the Iran nuclear deal – which Washington has 
sought to unravel, while also avoiding the destabilisation of Iran domestically with 
over-zealous sanctions (Geranmayeh, 2018, p. 11–13). At the same time, the EU should 
utilise its many bilateral partnerships in the Middle East to foster a multilateral 
dialogue for de-escalation (Biscop, 2020, p. 5; Geranmayeh, 2018, p. 13). The EU is 
perhaps uniquely placed to do this because of its historical and cultural ties with 
Turkey, Israel, and the Gulf States. In addition, the EU should seek to preserve and 
extend its global multilateral partnerships as counterweights to increasing dependence 
on China (Biscop, 2020, p. 6). Recent free trade agreements with other East Asian 
economies – including Japan and Singapore – as well as membership in the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), have so far been steps in the right direction 
(Biscop, 202, p. 2; Geeraerts, 2019, p. 4). The former decreases those economies’ 
dependence on either China or the US, and the latter allows the EU an opportunity to 
contribute to future order-shaping.  
Such measures would serve to firmly establish the EU as a distinct player in the new 
Great Game, with its own distinct interests and proven willingness to uphold them, 
rather than simply being another playing piece.  
Conclusion 
Our world is one of unprecedented interconnectedness, decentralisation, and risk. The 
Great Power chess games of old have been replaced with the complex flow and counter-
flow of wei qi. So far, the European Union has seemed largely on the back foot, 
compared to a forward-thinking China that has already mastered the rules of the new 
game. If the EU fails to assert itself soon, it risks being sidelined into the foreseeable 
future.  
The opportunity for this does remain. China has overextended itself in Europe’s 
periphery, pushing too hard, and failing to gain traction. The ongoing COVID crisis, 
moreover, continues to erode China’s imposing façade in Europe. The European Union 
should capitalise on this chance to regain its momentum and become an equal partner 
in what is in many ways the defining geopolitical relationship of our era.  
Nonetheless, the EU should be conscious of succumbing to “the American language of 
rivalry” (Biscop, 2020, p. 1). It should recognise that mutually positive relationships 
will need to be fostered with China, it just needs to approach these from a position of 
unity and equality, rather than inferiority and division. In the new game of wei qi, 
Europe needs to be an equal player, not an obscure huddle of pieces on the far side of 
the board. 
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